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When Are Agreements
Enforceable? Giving
Consideration to Professor
Barnett's Consent
Theory of Contract
James R. Maxeiner
University of Baltimore
I. INTRODUCTION

Agreements are at the heart of contract law. In AngloAmerican Common Law a persistent problem has been
determining which agreements should be enforced. The
common law has no difficulty dealing with bargainedfor agreements between merchants exchanging goods
for money, but has far more difficulty with agreements
where there is no clear quid pro quo, and therefore
"consideration" is doubtful. Most typically these
agreements include guaranties, gifts and other gratuitous promises. Why shouldn't my agreement to meet
Professor Sellers this evening for dinner be enforceable?
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Over twenty years ago Professor Randy E. Barnett
first proposed what he calls a "consent theory" of contract that he believes resolves most of these issues in
American common law. For the last two decades he has
promoted his theory and has gained significant attention
from the legal academy. This discussion will consider:
why the United States has contracts law theories; the
basic elements of Professor Barnett's theory; how these
elements are similar to Continental law;American legal
insularity in evaluating Barnett's theory without reference to Continental systems; and finally, why this author believes that American example of law harmonization through restate-ment and voluntary adoption of
uniform laws is not a good model for a future European
civil code.

II. WHY THE UNITED STATES HAS CONTRACT
LA W "THEORIES"
The last 30 years have seen a remarkable blossoming
of contracts law scholarship in the United States and the
development of a variety of contracts law theories such
as that of Professor Barnett. Europeans have looked
with a certain envy at the "rich literature" of American
contracts law and contrast that literature to what they
see as the "anti-theoretical nature of Continental Civil
Law contracts scholarship.
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Law and economics scholarship-which is by no
means limited to contracts law-in particular has provoked considerable interest in Europe. American contracts law scholars are proud to point to the "richness"
of American contract law and hope, in writing about it,
that they will gain the notice of scholars in other legal
systems. I
Europeans ought not to be envious of American contracts theories: they are indicative of the failure of the
American legal system to develop a comprehensive set
of contracts rules. A Greek professor, Aristides N. Hatzis, while admiring American contract theory, correctly
points out why there are no comparable theories in Continental law: "in Civil Law there is no need for theories
since the legislator, mainly through codes, has proclaimed what the law should be and the judge is (supposedly) a mere interpreter, useful only for accommodating trivial twists of facts." Hatzis observes that the
lack of codes in Common Law creates a need for theories "in order to provide a sense of security to the contracting parties who did not place any trust in the caprices of individual judges and were looking for a more
objective basis for their economic relationships.,,2
We have theory in the United States because our attempts at codes and rules have failed. For most of the
nineteenth century the legal community in the United
States debated the merits and demerits of codificaI See, in particular, Robert A. Hillman, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW
(1997). For a critical review, see Randy E. Barnett, Book Review, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 1413 (1999).
2 HATZIS at 5.
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tion. We had our own debate similar to that in Germany between Savigny and Thibaut. In Germany the
code won when the nation unified, but in the United
States, the fight took place at the state level and the
code lost. The debate began in the early part of the
nineteenth century and lasted until the death in 1894
of the most prominent of codification proponents,
David Dudley Field. Field, America's Thibaut, one
might say, saw rules as essential for predictability in
law. 3 His great opponent, James Coolidge Carter,
America's Savigny, argued that statutory rules "are
rigid and absolute, and cannot be modified and
shaped to suit the varying aspects which different
cases may exhibit.,,4 Politics as much as jurisprudential reasoning accounts for the defeat of the codes.
They simply were inconvenient for the practicing bar.
When the codification movement failed at the end
of the nineteenth century, alternative steps were taken
to unify the law of the several states. The drive for
unification of state law led to creation of two institutions which survive to this day: the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (Conference), founded in 1892, and the American Law
Institute (ALI), founded in 1923.
3 Stephan N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical
Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 340

(1988) ("In Field's world, predictability is more likely to be achieved with
relatively inflexible rules and precise definition and by curbing judicial discretion. Field did understand that some unpredictability was unavoidable; a statute
could not cover all situations and judges, on occasion, would have to analogize
or make new law.")
4 James Coolidge Carter, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON
LAW (1884), excerpted in THE LIFE OF THE LAW, READINGS ON THE GROWTH
OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 115, 120 (John Honold ed., 1964).
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Some Europeans have a rather rosy view of the success of these institutions. 5 Both the National Conference and the ALI depend upon voluntary adoption of
their work. The Conference and the ALI have almost no
coercive power. Their mandates focus on rationalizing
existing law in the form of uniform laws and restatements; law innovation, once almost clearly foreclosed,
still does not fit easily in their programs. 6 Few would
question that the Conference and the ALI have had
salutary effects on the content and uniformity of American law, but those. effects have not been nearly as substantial as their founders had hoped. In the first century
of its existence, the Conference proposed approximately
200 uniform acts. Only about 10 percent of these Acts
have been adopted by as many as forty states; more than
half were adopted by fewer than ten states. Since ALI
Restatements are not proposed for legislative adoption,
their adoption necessarily is piecemeal. Lacking rules,
we have theory. This brings us to Professor Barnett's
theory.

III. BARNETT'S CONSENT THEORY OF
CONTRACT
A central issue of the law of obligations is when
agreements should be enforced. In answering this ques5 See James R. Maxeiner, Standard Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic
Age: European Alternatives, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 109, 141, n. 196 (2003)
6 See James J. White, One Hundred Years of Uniform State Laws: Ex Proprio
Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2096, 2098-99 (1991).

[96]
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tion in the Anglo-American common law of contracts
the doctrine of consideration plays the central role.
Consideration is a "strange notion" for jurists in the
Continental tradition. The doctrine's roots are lost in
history. Even today it remains "obscure" and "relatively
ill-defined and controversial.,,7 In present-day America,
understanding consideration is a benefit received or a
detriment suffered. It must be bargained for. 8
Although consideration is a mandatory feature of instruction in contracts classes and on the bar examination, there is no consensus in the Common Law world
that consideration is a concept worth keeping. 9 Indicative of this ambivalence is the treatment consideration
received in the drafting of the Principles of European
Contract Law. While drafters were generally disposed
toward their own systems as "natural and just," consideration is one example that the Commission Chairman,
Professor Ole Lando, gives when drafters found weakness in their own systems. He reports that "[t]here was
no enthusiasm in the common law camp for the doctrine," so it was omitted. \0
Professor Barnett himself long ago reminded his
American colleagues that the bargain theory of consideration is "unavoidably plagued by serious defects." II It
7 Denis Tallon, Introduction, in HUGH BEAL ET AL., CASES, MATERIALS AND
TEXT ON CONTRACT LAW 140 (2002) [hereinafter cited as TALLON].
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17,71.
9 TALLON.
10 Ole Lando, Comparative Law and Lawmaking, 75 TUL. L. REv. 1015, 1022
(2001).
II Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal
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has two principal problems: some agreements are enforced, even though there is no bargain, while other
agreements are not enforced, even though there is a
bargain. In most commercial cases there is no problem
finding the bargained consideration. But the doctrine of
consideration handles other situations less well where
there is no bargain or the bargain is elusive, as in the
case of gifts, actions taken in reliance upon promises,
and binding offers.
Barnett finds the American solution to the question of
contract enforceability inadequate. Essentially, it consists of using bargained-for consid-eration as the principal device for determining enforceability and of filling
out gaps with various ad hoc doctrines such as promissory estoppel. 12 The doctrine of promissory estoppel
provides that "[a] promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on
the part of the promisee ... and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise." 13
Barnett would take a different approach. According to
Barnett, agreements (or more broadly, promises) should
be enforceable when parties "manifest their consent to a
legally binding transfer" of preexisting alienable
rights. 14 There must be a "manifested intention to create
Philosophy [Book Review of E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS] 97
tlARV. L. REV. 1223, 1239 (1984) [hereinafter Contract Scholarship]'
Contract Scholarship at 1240.
13 REST ATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90.
14 Contract Scholarship at 1242.

[98]
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legal relations or (to use another common formulation)
a manifested intention to be legally bound." 15 This is
"the key to distinguishing enforceable from unenforceable promises." 16 "The basis of contractual obligation is
not promising per se." It is the manifestation of an intention to be legally bound. "The basis of contract is
consent." 17
Barnett distinguishes his consent theory not only
from bargained consideration and reliance theories, but
also from other approaches such as a will theory, economic efficiency, substantive fairness and restitution. 18
He offers his theory as a way to negotiate among all of
these different theories and not as an "independent principle or core concern of contract." "[I]t seeks to provide
a general criterion of contractual enforceability that
strikes a reasonable and workable balance among the
[other] party-based, substance-based, and process principles .... ,,19 His theory provides a framework for ordering these concerns to show where each stands in relation to the others. 2o
Barnett grounds his consent theory in something
"more fundamental than the concepts of will, reliance,
15 Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L.
REv. 1002, 1027 (1992) [emphasis in original] [hereinafter Contract as Promise ].
16 I d. at 1029.
17 Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory o/Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269,
305 (1986) [hereinafter Consent Theory].
18 RANDY E. BARNETf, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINES 588-90 (3Cd ed.
2003) [hereinafter CASEBOOK]
19 CASEBOOK at 589; see Consent Theory at 271-91.
20 Consent Theory at 294.
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efficiency, fairness or bargain.,,21 That something more
is a theory of individual rights. Individuals have property rights that entitle them to use and consume resources. For Barnett, "the consent of the rights holder to
be legally obligated is the moral component that distinguishes valid from invalid transfers of alienable rights
in a system of entitlements. In sum, legal enforcement
is morally justified because the promisor voluntarily
performed acts that conveyed her intention to create a
legally enforceable obligation by transferring alienable
rights.,,22
With painstaking precIsion Barnett shows how his
theory of consent resolves numerous issues and problems of modern American contract law.
Unlike the will theory, the consent theory addresses
the conundrum of objective versus subjective wills. The
theory of rights requires that those rights be demarcated. Only a manifestation of assent that is accessible
to all can fulfill that function.23 A consent theory is interested in the actual intentions of the parties, but only
the objective interpretation of a commitment establishes
the clear boundaries required by an entitlements approach. 24 Still the objective interpretation is only the
presumptive meaning; it can be rebutted by a special
meaning that the parties shared. 25
21
22

23

24
25

Consent Theory at 293.
Consent Theory at 299.
Consent Theory at 302-03.
Consent Theory at 307.
Consent Theory at 307.

[100]
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The consent theory explains why in certain unusual
circumstances, the Common Law of contracts enforces
formal commitments where there is no bargained for
consideration. The voluntary use of a recognized formality manifests the intention to be legally bound. Here,
Barnett argues, consent provides "the missing theoretical foundation of formal contracts and explains their
proper place in a well-crafted law of contract.,,26
Where there is bargaining, in the consent theory,
there is little need to provide explicit proof of an intent
to be legally bound. The bargaining is itself the evidence of consent. 27 Indeed, Barnett's theory regards
consideration as one way of manifesting assent and not
as a requirement of a prima facie case of contractual
obligation. 28
Barnett sees his consent theory as also explaining
those circumstances under which promissory estoppel
grants relief. The reasonable reliance that promissory
estoppel requires, where the reliance is known or should
be known to the promising party, serves as that f<arty's
manifestation of an intention to be legally bound. 9
Barnett uses his consent theory to explain contract
defenses as situations where the manifestation of assent
does not have its normal moral and therefore, legal sigConsent Theory at 311.
Consent Theory at 313.
28 Consent Theory at 314.
29 Consent Theory at 314.
26

27
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nificance. One group of defenses-duress, misrepresentation and possibly unconscionability-are all situations
in which the manifestation was obtained by the other
party's improper action. A second group-incapacity,
infancy and intoxication-hold that the promiser did
not have the ability to give meaningful assent. Finally a
third group-mistake, impracticability and frustrationstem from the inability to fully express in any agreement all possibilities that might affect performance. 30
Armed with his consent theory, Barnett attacks the
persistent problem of form contracts. The problem is, if
contract is based on promise, how can someone have
promised to do something in a writing she or he has not
read and was not expected to read. On the one hand, if
the test is objective action, the parties have agreed. If,
on the other hand, the test is the subjective view of the
parties, then one party to the form contract has not
agreed. 31 For Barnett, the solution is clear: "enforcement of private agreements is not about promising, but
about manifesting consent to be legally bound." Thus
what matters is not the assent to do an act, but the assent to be legally bound to do so. The agreement is to
do whatever the other party says. But, according to
Barnett, "I agree" really means "I agree to be legally
bound to (unread) terms that are not radically unexpected.,,32 In other words, I agree to terms "that I am
Consent Theory at 318.
Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 627,
628 (2002) [hereinafter Form Contracts].
32 Form Contracts at 637.
30

31
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not likely to have read but that do not exceed some
bound of reasonableness.,,33

IV. SIMILARITIES OF BARNETT'S THEORY OF
CONTRACT TO CONTRACT LAW IN EUROPE
By now, contracts scholars in the audience from Civil
Law countries are suppressing yawns. What is new,
they may be thinking, about Professor Barnett's theory?
After all, does not Article 2: 101 of the Principles of
European Contract Law provide explicitly: "A contract
is concluded if: a) the parties intend to be legally
bound, and b) they reach a sufficient agreement without
any further requirement." Of course it does.
Intent to be bound runs throughout Continental legal
systems. For example, Article 3.33 of the Dutch Civil
Code provides: "A juridical act requires an intention to
produce juridical effects, which intention has manifested itself by a declaration.,,34 Professor Lando, in
writing about the Principles of European Contract Law,
observes that "[t]here is consistency among the laws
that agreement only becomes a binding contract if the
parties have intended to be legally bound." Thus, returning to the example at the beginning, in every European legal system, while I may be morally bound to
honor my promise to have dinner with Professor Sell33

Fo~m Contracts at 638.

34

NEW NETHERLANDS CIVIL CODE: PATRIMONIAL LAW (Haanappel, P.P.C.

and Mackaay, E., eds. and trans\., \990).
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ers, I am not legally bound to, because there is no intent
to be legally bound. 35
Just how far back in European legal history the concept of "intent to be bound" as a means of validating
contract enforceability goes, I do not know, but clearly
it goes back at least as far the nineteenth century when
it found its way into the German Civil Code.
The German Civil Code-or BGB-places the doctrines of declaration of will (Willenserklarung) and of
juridical act (Rechtsgeschaft) at the heart of the code's
treatment of obligations. 36 The BGB enforces objectively manifested statements of consent notwithstanding
undisclosed subjective intent to the contrary.37 Yet it
provides that the subjective intentions of the parties are
to be determined in interpreting their declarations. 38
The BGB imposes no requirement of consideration and
validates promises made with intention to be bound
notwithstanding the absence of anything that might be
deemed consideration. 39 It denies enforceability where
the promise is not meant seriously and there is no intenOle Lando, Salient Features of the Principles of Contract Law: A Comparison with the UCC, I3 PACE INT'L L. REV. 339, 345 (2001).
36 See BGB §§ 116-144. In a much quoted passage from the legislative history
of the first draft of 1882, the drafters said:
[Oas Rechtsgeschafi bedeutet] eine Privatwillenserkliirung gerichtet auf die
Hervorbringung eines rechtlichen Erfolges, der nach der Rechtsordnung
deswegen eintritt ist. Oas Wesen des Rechtsgeschafts wird darin gefunden, daB
ein auf die Hervorbringung rechtlicher Wirkungen gerichteter Wille bestatigt,
und daB der Spruch des Rechtsordnung in Anerkennung dieses Willens die
~ewollte rechtliche Gestaltung in der RechtsweIt verwirklicht.
7 BGB § 116 (Geheimer Vorbehalt).
38 BGB § 133 (Auslegung einer Willenserklarung).
39 See TALLON at 153.
35

[104]
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tion to be bound. 40 For gratuitous promises, German
law sometimes has form requirements and the BGB
provIsions governing Willenserkliirung implement
those. 41 The doctrine of Willenserkliirung or the still
more general provisions regarding juristic act treat the
American contract law defenses. The BGB provides
that a juristic act that is contrary to law or good morals
is void. 42 It makes voidable declarations of will produced by misrepresentation or duress. 43 It provides that
in most instances the declaration of will of someone
without capacity is void. 44 It makes voidable declarations of will made as a consequent ofmistake. 45 All this
the German Civil Code accomplishes in about 40 relatively short sections that take about seven pages in a
popular edition. In other parts of the Code it addresses
impracticability of performance 46 and unfair terms in
standard form contracts. 47 The treatment of standard
terms contracts is similar to that proposed by Barnett,
but far more robust. 48 The philosophical basis of the
German Civil Code provisions are an overt manifestation of the view of freedom of contract as it prevailed in
the late nineteenth century.
BGB § 117 (Scheingeschiift); § 118 (Mangel der Emstlichkeit).
BGB §§ 125-129.
42 BGB § 134 (Gesetzliches Verbot); § 138 (Sillenwidriges Rechtsgeschiitft;
Wucher).
43 BGB § 123 (Anfechtbarkeit wegen Tiiuschung oder Drohung).
44 BGB § 145 (Nichtigkeit der Willenserkliirung). Other provisions in this
section, § 104-1 13, govern limited capacity for minors.
45 BGB § 119 (Anfechtbarkeit wegen ["turns).
46 BGB § 119.
47 BGB §§ 305-309.
48 See generally, James R. Maxeiner, Standard Terms Contracting in the
Global Electronic Age: European Alternatives, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 109
(2003).
40
41
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V. AMERICAN INSULARITY
That Barnett's theory of consent is similar to approaches of European civil law is not remarkable. For
centuries Common Law countries have borrowed legal
ideas from Civil Law countries to enrich contract law 49
and Civil Law Countries have borrowed from Common
Law countries as well. 50 What is remarkable is that
Barnett-and apparently American contracts law scholars generally-consider Barnett's theory to be a new
one and have not noted its close similarity to European
law.
Barnett likens his theory to new scientific theories
such as those discussed by Thomas S. Kuhn in that author's famous 1962 book The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. Barnett offers his theory as a "potentially
valuable approach to explaining contractual obligation"
that might permit "the ongoing discussion of contractual obligation to emerge from its longstanding intellectual cul-de-sac and begin traveling a more productive
course.,,51 Barnett counts his theory a controversial one
and questions whether it is even suitable reading for
first year students. 52
Controversial it is. A number of writers have taken issue with it. Its central proposition is largely rejected by
See, e.g., James Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some
Unfinished Business, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1815, 1847 (2000).
50 Perhaps less in contract law directly and more in ancillary areas such as
~roduct liability and antitrust.
I Consent Theory at 321.
52 CASEBOOK at 538.

49

[106]
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the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in its section 21,
which provides: "Neither real nor apparent intention
that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a manifestation of intention
that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract."
Yet where is the discovery in Barnett's theory? It astonishes that in the twenty years that Barnett's proposal
has been on the table, apparently no American contracts
scholar has remarked on the similarities of his theory to
the Civil Law. 53 Why do I have the feeling that it is as
if someone in the United States announced the discovery of Pasteurization a century after Pasteur introduced
it in France? In American patent law, inventors cannot
claim a patent if anywhere in the world someone has
published the same idea more than a year before the
inventor applies for the patent.
Barnett has told me that he was not aware of Continental European law when he proposed his theory.
That's too bad. If he had been, he could have made his
life a lot easier by studying that law first, and he might
have made his proposals even better.
That he was not aware of Continental law is in at least
one way comforting. He did not conceal, as Karl Llewellyn once recommended, a foreign origin because of
fear of adverse American reaction. 54 Llewellyn, who
Barnett himself, however, has pointed out similarities to English law.
In his Consent Theory Barnett thanks Professor George Fletcher for helpful
comments. Fletcher later specifically called the attention of American jurists to

53

54
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was principal drafter of the Uniform Commercial Code,
took many of his ideas from German law. Yet he did
not disclose, let alone discuss, their origin. He counseled that to disclose the foreign origin of a legal idea in
the United States was tantamount to giving it the "kiss
of death.,,55
But surely someone, somewhere along the line, has
thought the similarity worth mentioning? Barnett's
work has been subject to critical consideration. He and
other American scholars have discussed his theory at
length for over two decades. In all of this literature I
have not found so much as a passing reference to Continental theories. I conclude that American scholars
simply were unaware of the foreign law.
I know from my own experience that this ignorance
of foreign solutions is not limited to Barnett's theory.
Contracts scholarship has blossomed in the last thirty
years and yet other developments central to contract
law, such as the European Union's Unfair Terms Directive and Germany's Standard Terms Law, have gone
completely unnoticed in the United States. And that is
so even as those very same issues have consumed much
of the American debate over new contract law. 56 While
the importance of the Gennan teachings of Rechtsgeschiiji and WillenserkIdrung. See George P. Fletcher, Three Nearly Sacred Books in Western Law,
54 ARK. L. REv. 1 (2001).
55 Stefan Riesenfeld, The Impact of German Legal Ideas and Institutions on
Legal Thought and Institutions in the United States, in Mathias Reimann (ed.),
THE RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD 18201920,89,91 (1993).
56 See James R. Maxeiner, Standard Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age: European Alternatives: 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 109 (2003).
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creating a single European Market has made it a matter
of course in Europe to examine foreign solutions-a
part of the Zeitgeist 57 -it remains extraordinary in the
United States.
Why are American jurists so insular? It was not always so. In the nineteenth century Americans were frequently keenly aware of foreign alternatives and anxious to learn from them. One of our most famous Supreme Court Justices, Joseph Story, said: "There is no
country on earth which has more to gain than ours by
the thorough study of foreign jurisprudence.,,58 There is
a lively debate right now between present-day Justices
Breyer and Scalia, as to whether the United States Supreme Court should take note of foreign punishments in
applying the cruel and unusual prohibition of the U.S.
Constitution.
While the American University debate is encouraging, the sad fact remains that the vast majority of
American jurists lack any first-hand experience with
Civil Law systems. Far more Americans enrolled in
European universities to study the European Civil Law
in the second half of the nineteenth century than did in
the second half of the twentieth century. In Civil Law
faculties in Europe and Asia, serious foreign study is
the rule among faculty members rather than the rare
S7

See

Abo

Junker,

Rechtsvergleichung

als

Grundlagenfach,

1994

JURISTENZEITUNG 921.
S8 Progress of Jurisprudence, Address Delivered Before the Suffolk Bar at their
Anniversary September 4, 1821, at Boston, reprinted in THE MISCELLANEOUS

WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 198, 235 (1852). He added: Let us not vainly
imagine that we have unlocked and exhausted all the stores of juridical wisdom
and policy." Id.
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exception that in the United States. 59 Serious study of a
foreign system, in the language of that system, is essential to serious comparative law work.
American lack of interest in foreign solutions is not
malicious. There are many reasons for the lack of interest. Among the principal reasons for American insularity are American political hegemony-and the lack of
language skills that that brings-and American legal
methods that anticipate incremental judicial development of law rather than legislation. 6o
In the nineteenth century, the United States did not
enjoy world hegemony. In that century, Americans did
study foreign legal solutions. But two world wars and
the development of American hegemony in the world
have led to American neglect of foreign legal solutions.
I have to say that European history does not make it
easy for those Americans who would like to promote
Civil Law solutions. Inevitably, our American listeners
object: the Civil Law had Hitler and we did not. Thus,
in the twentieth century Americans switched from
learning from foreign law to teaching American law to
foreigners. American law became "imperial law." If the
first five years of the twenty-first century are any guide,
59 One law EU fmn-Freshfields-probably has more jurists who have seriously studied both Civil and Common Law than all American law faculties
combined! While American summer law school programs abroad encourage
students to learn foreign and comparative law, few observers would count them
as serious attempts to learn foreign legal systems.
60 See generally Ernst Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Why are u.s. Lawyers not
Learningfrom Comparative Law?, in THE INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW
213 (Nedim Vogtetal. eds., 1997).
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Americans in this century are, if anything, going to be
more "imperial" in law than in the last. 61
One consequence of American hegemony and of the
resulting dominance of English as the world language is
a lack of skills with foreign languages on the part of
America's intellectual leadership. Before the First
World War, 25 percent of American high school students studied German; since then, the number studying
German has never exceeded 4 percent. Even under the
best of circumstances, Americans would not normally
learn foreign languages at a level sufficient to use them
in academic work. The land is huge and there is little
need or use for foreign languages for most people. I
grew up in St. Louis: the nearest places where foreign
languages are spoken are Mexico or Quebec, each of
which is about 1500 kilometers away. Contrast that to
Europe; in Belgium alone, there are three official languages: Flemish, French and German. Moreover, English is inescapable here. The 50 American states have
one official language: English. The 25 EU Member
States have around two dozen. Finally, in Continental
Europe, the first foreign language is automatic: English.
In the United States, with which foreign language
should a student begin: Spanish, Chinese, French, German, Russian, Italian, Japanese?
Yet without foreign language skills, one cannot learn
the Civil Law systems first hand. One must rely on
Cf, Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on u.s. Hegemony and
the Latin ReSistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 383, 391 (2003).
61
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translations. There is a natural tendency to ignore that
which one cannot understand and to regard it as unimportant. Thus, even as American law school faculties
have shown a greatly increased interest in scholarship,
comparative law has not benefited.

VI. A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE?
I cannot resist the temptation to consider briefly one
of the most interesting projects in the works today, a
European Civil Code. As an American comparativist
eager to get his colleagues to pay attention to the Civil
Law, there is nothing that I should welcome more than
a European Civil Code. No doubt that Code, much preparatory work and commentary would be in English.
The Civil Law would finally be accessible in English.
My colleagues could seize upon this wealth of legal
learning. That learning would have behind it the force
of the European Union-a political entity larger than
our own-and would no longer be the patchwork law of
25 or 27 or 28 European states.
Whether a single European Code would work for
Europe, or is even politically tenable, I do not know.
Maybe the legal certainty and unity desired would be
better obtained by a mixture of conflicts of law rules
and of harmonized, not unified laws.
I do feel relatively sure, however, that devices such as
the Principles of European Contract Law alone would
not be sufficient to bring about the desired legal unity.
[112]
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When Are Agreements Enforceable?
American experiences suggest that unless Europeans
are willing to accept a level of legal uncertainty much
greater than they historically have, voluntary approaches such as legal theory, Restatements and voluntary state laws, are not the answer. Legal unity and certainty should be imposed at the European-level even if
that unity allows a great deal of diversity and subsidiarity within it.
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